Abstract. Kiltz proposed a practical key encapsulation mechanism(Kiltz07-KEM) which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks(IND-CCA2) under the gap hashed Diffie-Hellman(GHDH) assumption [8] . We show a variant of Kiltz07-KEM which is more efficient than Kiltz07-KEM in encryption. The new scheme can be proved to be IND-CCA2 secure under the same assumption, GHDH.
Introduction
Security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 security) [1] [2] [3] is now commonly accepted as the standard security notion for public key encryption schemes. Currently, most of the practical IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption schemes in standard model are variants of ElGamal [4] scheme. Cramer and Shoup [5, 6] proposed the first provably IND-CCA2 secure practical public key encryption scheme based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman(DDH) assumption in the standard model. This was further improved by Kurosawa and Desmedt and yield a more efficient scheme(KD04) [7] . Kiltz proposed a IND-CCA2 secure KEM(key encapsulation mechanism) under the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman(GHDH) assumption [8] . Combined with a redundancy-free DEM(data encapsulation mechanism) it will yield a IND-CCA2 secure hybrid encryption scheme more efficient than KD04.
Our Contributions
We show a variant of Kiltz07-KEM which can be proved to be IND-CCA2 secure under the same assumption, GHDH. The new scheme is similar to Kiltz07-KEM, while the only difference is that the second item of the ciphertext u rt v r is replaced with u r v rt . Thus, the encryption of the new scheme only need three exponentiations. Compared with Kiltz07-KEM, the efficiency of the encryption is improved by 14.3%.
Definitions
In this section we describe the definitions of KEM, GHDH assumption and target collision resistant hash function. In describing probabilistic processes, we write x R ← X to denote the action of assigning to the variable x a value sampled according to the distribution X. If S is a finite set, we simply write s R ← S to denote assignment to s of an element sampled from uniform distribution on S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm and x an input, then A(x) denotes the output distribution of A on input x. Thus, we write y R ← A(x) to denote of running algorithm A on input x and assigning the output to the variable y.
Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A key encapsulation mechanism consists the following algorithms:
-KEM.KeyGen(1 k ): A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter (1 k ) and outputs a public key PK and secret key SK. We write (PK,SK) ← KEM.KeyGen(1 k ) -KEM.Encrypt(PK): A probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm takes as input the public key PK, and outputs a pair (K, ψ), where K ∈ K D (K D is the key space) is a key and ψ is a ciphertext. We write (K, ψ) ← KEM.Encrypt(PK) -KEM.Decrypt(SK, ψ): A decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext ψ and the secret key SK. It returns a key K. We write K ← KEM.Decrypt(SK, ψ).
We require that for all (PK,SK) output by KEM.
A KEM scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if the advantage of any adversary in the following game is negligible in the security parameter k:
1. The adversary queries a key generation oracle. The key generation oracle computes (PK,SK) ← KEM.KeyGen(1 k ) and responds with PK. 2. The adversary makes a sequence of calls to the decryption oracle. For each decryption oracle query the adversary submits a ciphertext ψ, and the decryption oracle responds with KEM.Decrypt(SK, ψ). 3. The adversary queries an encryption oracle. The encryption oracle computes:
and responds with (K b , ψ * ). 4. The adversary continues to make calls to the decryption oracle except that it may not request the decryption of ψ * . 5. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b .
The adversary's advantage in the above game is AdvCCA KEM,A (k) = | Pr[b = b ] − 1/2|. If a KEM is secure against adpative chosen ciphertext attack defined in the above game we say it is IND-CCA secure.
Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Now we review the definition of gap hashed Diffie-Hellman assumption [8] . Let G be a group of large prime order q, H : G → {0, 1} l be a cryptographic hash function and consider the following two experiment: experiments Exp ghdh G,H,A (l): 
Target collision resistant hash function
A (t, ) target collision resistant hash function (TCR) family is a collection F of functions f K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m indexed by a key K ∈ K (where K denotes the key space), and such that any attack algorithm A running in time t has success probability at most in the following game:
-Key Sampling: A uniformly random key K ∈ K is chosen (but not yet revealed to A). -A Commits: A runs (with no input) and outputs a hash function input s 1 ∈ {0, 1} n . -Key Revealed: The key K is given to A. -A Collides: A continues running and outputs a second hash function input s 2 ∈ {0, 1} n .
We say that A succeeds in the above game if it finds a valid collision for f K , i.e. if
We say H is target collision resistant hash function if AdvT CR is negligible.
Variant of Kiltz07-KEM
In this section we describe the new scheme as follow:
-KeyGen: Assume that G is group of order q where q is a large prime number.
Where H : G → {0, 1} l is the hash function used in the GHDH assumption, l is the length of the key, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function. -Encrypt: Given P K, the encryption algorithm runs as follow:
-Decrypt: Given a ciphertext ψ = (c 1 , c 2 ) and SK, the decryption algorithm runs as follow:
; else return ⊥ Now we prove that the KEM above is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks:
Theorem 1. The key encapsulation above is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming that: (1)GHDH problem is hard in the group G, (2)TCR is a target collision resistant hash function.
To prove the theorem, we will assume that there is an adversary A that can break the hybrid encryption scheme above, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function and show how to use this adversary to construct an adversary B to break the GHDH problem.
Given (g, u, g r , W ), B runs the following key generation algorithm:
The public key that A sees is (g, u, v, T CR, H), H : G → {0, 1} l is the hash function used in the GHDH assumption, l is the length of the key, TCR is a target collision resistant hash function. B knows y.
First we describe the simulation of the encryption oracle. In step 3, B sends (c 1 = g r , c 2 = c yt 1 , k = W ) to A. Since c 2 = c yt 1 = g yrt = u r (g y u −1/t ) rt = u r v rt , we have that the simulation of the encryption oracle is perfect.
We now describe the simulation of the decryption oracle. Given (c 1i , c 2i ), B works as follow:
It is clear that the simulation of the decryption oracle is perfect. Finally, when A return b , B also output b . Let u = g x , if b = 0 it means that k = W = H(g xr ). So, if A breaks the scheme successfully, then B breaks the GHDH problem successfully. That's complete the proof of theorem 1.
Efficiency Analysis
The efficiency of the new scheme and Kiltz07-KEM is listed in table 1. When tabulating computational efficiency hash function is ignored, multi-exponentiation (mexp) is counted as 1.5 exponentiations (exp). Ciphertext overhead represents the difference between the ciphertext length and the message length, and |q| is the length of a group element. It is clear that the encryption of the new scheme is about 14.3% faster than that of Kiltz07-KEM.
